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Dear Ismail, 
It is my pleasure to submit to you the report of the 
Panel you appointed last July to study the CGIAR's 
long-term governance and financing structure. 
I believe that my colleagues in the Panel would agree 
with me that the opportunity to discuss some of the 
major challenges facing the CGIAR in a small, but 
diverse group has been a most rewarding and intellec- 
tually stimulating experience for all of us. The 
Panel you assembled represented a broad range of 
perspectives on - and a lot of experience with - our 
System. We have benefitted greatly from the many 
excellent papers prepared by other bodies of the 
CGIAR before us, and which are listed in Annex C of 
our report. 
We also had the privilege of being supported by a 
team, headed by Selcuk Gzgediz, that is second to 
none and without which the Panel would not have been 
able to do much justice to its terms of reference 
within such a short time as was given to us. I would 
like to pay special thanks to IFPRI for permitting us 
to have Curtis Farrar on the Support team. His wise 
council and long memory with the CGIAR has been a 
great help. 
Finally, our thanks go to you for taking so much time 
out of your busy schedule and sharing with us your 
ideas and reacting to our preliminary thinking. 
Immediately after the last session of the Panel our 
main findings were presented to the Stakeholder Panel 
and the Steering Committee. The excellent discussions 
which that gave rise to indicated a need to provide 
more background on some of the points we made. 
- 3. - 
This has been attempted in the enclosed, final 
report, which has the unanimous endorsement of all 
members of the Panel. 
Due to time constraints the Panel could not work out 
the cost implications of its proposals but has asked 
the CGIAR Secretariat, if possible, to do so in order 
for the information to be available at the time of 
Centers Week. The costs to be considered would in- 
clude notably those relating to the Global Forum, the 
Regional Fora, and the increased participation from 
developing country stakeholders. On the other hand, 
savings may be achieved over time when the Mid-Term- 
Meeting, as proposed, involves fewer participants. 
Our report does not call for revolutionary changes in 
the CGIAR. The Panel believes that our System is 
basically sound, but we also believe that it can be 
further improved and we do hope that we have been 
able to make some contributions to that effect. 
On behalf of the Study Panel, 
Yours sincerely 
Report of the Study Panel on the 
CGIAR’s Long-Term Governance and Financing Structure 
Panel lnembem 
Klaus Winkel (Denmark) - Chairman 
Bo Bengtsson (Sweden) 
Andrew Bexmett (UK) 
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Susan Pearson (U.S.A.) 
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In July 1994 the CGIAR Chair appointed a Study Panel to “recommend a future governance, 
decision-making, and financing structure and mechanisms for the CGIAR, taking into account the long- 
term vision and objectives of the system and the consensus on these matters reached at MTh4 94.” The 
Panel, chaired by Klaus Winkel of Denmark, met twice in Washington, DC, August 22-24 and September 
11-12, 1994 and completed its draft report. 
The issues identified by the Panel fell into four broad areas: research agenda setting, governance, 
the CGIAR’s operating system, and finance. The Panel’s main conclusions and recommendations in these 
areas are summar ized below.’ 
Starling Assumptions 
The Panel began its work by agreeing on the following set of assumptions: 
1. Vision. A CGIAR vision statement is being prepared. Its goals will include the 
alleviation of poverty, food security, and protection of the environment; it will feature the need 
to improve the productivity of the resources committed to agriculture, forestry and fisheries - 
while protecting the environment - and will emphasize the major role of improved technologies 
from agricultural research in achieving these aims. 
2. mom research. There will continue to be development issues and challenges that can 
be addressed most effectively through a well-coordinated international agricultural research 
system that will chiefly benefit developing countries. 
3. Partnerships. Future research will be characterized by a high degree of collaboration 
among several actors, one of which will be a strong CGIAR. 
4. Fording. The CGIAR will continue to rely primarily on public funds. In order to 
remain competitive, the CGIAR will need to articulate its priorities clearly and demonstrate its 
efficiency and impact. 
5. Gouernunce. The CGIAR’s future governance should be efficient and responsive to 
change. 
’ Ihe panel uses the term “agricultural research a throughout the report as a shodand for research 
on agriculture, firestry, fisheries, and management of natural resources. l%e term CGUR refers to the 
consultative Group, whereas “the System” or “CGUR System” refers to the entire enterprise which 
includes the Gmsultati~ Group and its secretariat, the centers, TAC and its secretariat, and the co- 
sponsors. 
. . . 
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Research Agenda Setting 
The Panel m that, with the help of the co-sponsors, the CGIAR play a catalytic 
leadership role in arranging a discussion among all of the major actors of the global agricultural research 
agenda. It also concludes that the CGIAR’s current agenda set?ng practices must be improved through 
greater transparency, expanded participation by developing countries, and more evidence of efficiency 
in pursuing primary CGIAR goals. 
Governance 
The Panel’s key considerations on governance are as follows: 
1. The CGIAR’s future system of governance must aim to improve the quality of its 
de&ions and enrciency of decision proasw. 
2. The CGIAR should not seek to be established as an international organization because, 
for the time being, it can achieve ita objectives efficiently under an informnl framework. 
3. The CGIAR’s strength lies in its sclentIfIc excellence and dedication to produce relevant 
outputs in the form of international public goods. It should play a scientific leadership 
role in the international scene also by making scientific inputs to the resolution of policy 
qUeStiOnS. 
4. The CGLU should continue to carry out its activities through coIIaborative programs 
managed primarily by a n&work of accountable international centers. 
5. The future governance structure of the CGIAR should allow for much increased 
ownership of the system by developing countries. 
The Panel considered five options on the CGIAR’s future governance and recommends the 
following: 
1. ‘Ibe CGIAR should adopt a two-tier deliberation and decision-making structure made up 
of GlobaVReglonaI Fora and a Business Forum. 
2. Qlgbal Pow. ‘Ihe CGIAR should, with the support of the cosponsors, organize a 
Global Forum on Agriahral Reseprdr for Development. The forum would include 
all actors involved with such research.2 Meetings every other year would: 
0 identify problems, describe progress, and establish needs for international 
agricultural research; 
0 assess and clarify global priorities; 
0 suggest roles for various actors; 
2 These uwild include representatives of govwnments, international organizatbns, donor agencies, 
non-gownment organkations, and research institutions including NARS and the CGUR centers. 
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0 explore ways to strengthen alliances and partnerships. 
Regional Fora that meet the needs and interests of each region, and are coordinated with 
existing similar efforts, could be a valuable colrnlement to the Global Forum. These fora 
might be organ&d under the auspices of the cosponsors and regional organizations. 
3. &&tss Fonrgg The business forum of the CGIAR, i.e., the Consultative Group 
itself, should be constituted of: 
uqonsors; 
representatives from developing countries; and, 
countries or institutions financing activities within the CGIAR’s approved 
agenda through an annual cash contribution above a fixed minimum 
level. 
4. The panel notes that the Global Forum would have some influence on agenda setting and 
policy formulation for the CGIAR, and enhance to some degree the participation of 
developing countries in that process. The CGIAR should take the following additional 
measures to enhance developing country participation within the business forum: 
4.1 Countries hosting the headquarters of CGIAR centers should be encouraged 
to become members of the CGIAR, with the proviso that the minimum cash 
contributions required from them would be one-half the level required from other 
members. 
4.2 Groups of countries should be allowed to pool their resources to meet the 
minimum contribution requirement and have a single membership in the CGIAR. 
4.3 Through high level contacts efforts should be intensified to encourage other 
beneficiary countries to become members. 
5. The steps recommended above would increase the possibilities for greater ownership of 
the CGIAR by developing countries. The cosponsors should review progress in this area 
and assess if there continues to be need to complement reprmentation of developing 
country views by members making financial contributions with the mechanism of 
selecting regional representatives. 
6. meof&- . The Panel has considered two options: 
Ontioa 1: To elect a Steering Committee to conduct the CGIAR’s business between 
CGIAFt meetings. The Steering Committee would be chaired by the 
CGIAR Chair and would have one or more standing subcommittees 
(such as on finance and oversight.) 
The CGIAR would meet once annually. The Mid-Term Meeting would 
be replaced with a meeting of the Steering Committee. 
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This option would essentially continue the present Steering Committee 
arrangement, with delegated powers to enable it act for the CGIAR 
between the annual meetings. 
‘The would be no Steering Committee with delegated powers as in 
Gption 1. But, the CGIAR would form from its membership one or 
more standing uunmittees (such as on finance and oversight) to facilitate 
the handling of its business. The current Mid-Term Meeting would take 
place, but with the attendance of a relatively small group, such as in the 
form of an Executive Session attended by the heads of member 
delegations, representatives from developing countries, and (as observers) 
the chairs of CBC and CDC. Standing committees would be able to 
conduct their business in parallel session and report to the whole CGIAR 
during the same week. CGIAR members who are not members of 
standing committees would be organized into one or more ad hoc 
committeea io handle some of the substantive items on the agenda (such 
as external reviews). 
The chairs of the standing CGIAR committees and the cosponsors would 
meet under the chairmanship of the CGIAB Chair as a CGIAB Bnreau 
to consult on major issues which may arise between the two CGIAR 
meetings. 
The Panel’s preference is for Option 2, which, among other advantages, could facilitate 
the CGIAR’s agenda setting process as illustrated in the following manner: 
0 At Centers Week each year, the Group would hold a preliminary 
discussion in the presence of all of the centers of the guidelines for the 
research agenda for the year after the coming one. This discussion 
would be informed by the findings of the most recent Global Forum. 
0 In the early part of the calendar year, and guided by the outcome of the 
Centers Week discussion, TAC would prepare a recommended agenda 
on the basis of center and program submissions. 
0 TAC’s agenda draft and its requirements would be considered at the 
MTM, initially by the committee dealing with financial matters. The 
MTM Executive Session would then review and approve TAO 
recommendations and the tentative financing plan proposed by the 
committee. 
0 In the following months, negotiations would be held with donors on 
funding the agenda so that it could be submitted to the Group for final 
approval at centers week with funding commitments well defined. 
0 Having approved a funded agenda for the coming year, the Group would 
then proceed to the preliminary diicussion of the next iteration of the 
research agenda which marks the first stage of the next cycle. 
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The Panel recom&r& refinement and adoption of a planning and funding cycle along 
the above lines under the leadership of the CGIAR Steering Committee. 
7. m. The CGTAR should consider ~X~YMEXQ the cosponsors group to include 
UNEP which carries responsibilities in key mandate areas of the CGIAR. 
Operating System 
The Panel made a number of comments and recommendations concerning the operating system 
of the CGIAR, that is the set of institutions and mechanisms by which the CGIAR System 
actually produces its outputs. These recommendations were made in the Wntext of the matrix 
approach to the definition and funding of the CGIAR &earcb agenda which has important 
implications for the operating system, implications which will become more profound as the new 
governance and funding systems mature. 
1. The Panel ~mmendp a view of the future operating system of CGIAR, under which 
centers would be considered franchised institutions, which would implement clearly 
defined activities within program areas with specified goals and time-Iimited objectives, 
financed by the CGIAR donors. The focus of the CGIAR would be on identifying and 
planning for program areas, and monitoring and evaluating performance on this basis as 
well. This change has very important implications for the relationships between the 
CGIAR and the centers, and the freedom of action of the latter. The Panel further 
recommends that a measured transition in this direction commence from 19%. 
2. The governance and management of programs involving several partners will present 
a fresh challenge to the System and one which may have various answers. The Panel 
-a that: 
0 there should be clear leadership responsibility and accountability for each 
program, in most cases through a lead center; 
0 proposals for program management and coordination should come from 
the lead institution(s), and should be appraised by TAC and the CGIAR 
Secretariat before approval for funding beyond an initial phase; 
a once a program is in full operation, it should be subjected to external 
monitoring and review of its scientific and management aspects as well 
as its impact, through processes devised by the System. 
3. New ways of operating the CGIAR System, such as the shift to a program focus, will 
place new demands and constraints on centers and may, in some cases, reduce center 
autonomy. In particular these changes will require Boards to build new strengths. The 
Panel recommen& greater efforts to find quality board members and provide them with 
the information and other support needed to perform their critical responsibilities. The 
boards should redouble their efforts to serve as vehicles through which developing 
country concerns can be brought to bear on the CGIAR system at its cutting edge. 
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4. Evaluation and the measurement of impact are critical areas for strengthened effort, on 
l . which the Panel made several JXXD~II@&OIQ . 
a. Besides taking steps to increa~s effectiveness, the CGIAR needs to 
improve the degree of impact achieved, and recognition of that 
impnct. To this end, the System should continue to strengthen its skills 
in presenting policy choices, and its understanding of social concerns and 
of development issues and problems. It should take part in international 
debates and be responsive to international concerns and plans of action; 
it should not only improve its skills in dissemination, but also become an 
active partner in the pm of problem analysis, demand 
identification, adaptation, uptake and impact. 
b. The system needs above all to maintain credible output and 
performance measures and evaluath systems, adjusted to changing 
requirements. The external reviews of institutions should continue, but 
should be gradually replaced in part by a new system of efficiency 
assurance and impact assessment focussed on programs that involve 
several centers and other partners. Center reviews would focus on 
institutional matters, such as boards, management, and research support. 
C. The Panel recommend the mounting of a systemwide effort, with inputs 
from TAC, the CGIAR Secretariat and the centers, to develop systematic 
and continuous processes for m assessment, to supplement existing 
processes for: 
- ensuring relevance of CGIAR activities; 
- measuring outputs and performance; 
- assessing performance incentives; 
- monitoring programs; and 
- conducting ex-post evaluation 
for discussion and endorsement by the CGIAR. 
5. It is more important than ever for the CGIAR System at all levels, and particularly the 
centers, to identify and work with partners. In the future, centers can be expected to 
become both leaner and more flexible institutions, and to carry on their programs to a 
much greater extent through engaging partners to perform agreed tasks rather than 
through the efforts of their own staff. This they would do, in part, because working with 
partners is a way to gain efficiencies. To encourage progress in this direction, the Panel 
recornmen& that the CGIAR provide incentives for the formation of partnerships - 
including those among CGIAR centers - and ensure that funding systems are adjusted 
to facilitate these collaborative modes of working. 
. . . 
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Funding the CGIAR Research Agenda 
Securing adequate funding for the CGIAR research agenda on a more stable and predictable basis 
is one of the goals of the entire process which the CGIAR is un%taking in the period between now and 
the beginning of 1996. While many others are working on aspects of this problem, the Panel took very 
seriously its responsibility of looking for ways of moving toward multiyear funding arrangements and 
defining negotiation processes with that purpose. The Panel started with a realization that there are no 
simple answers, and that any proposal must take account of the widely varying policies and approaches 
among donors who are actually or potentially committed to the CGIAR. The assumption that the 
principal source of funding of the CGIAR System fir the immediate Wure will remain development 
assistance guided the Panel in making the following recommendations: 
1. Efforts to build public awammw and conduct fun&a&g at the highest levels in donor 
agencies are a critical precondition for success and should continue and be strengthened. 
2. ‘I%e matrix scheme proposed by the CGIAR Chair offers a means for defining and 
funding the requirements of the CGIAR research agenda. The introduction of program 
areas as major channels for funds should allow donors greater flexibility to select the 
kinds of commitments they would be able to make to support the research agenda of the 
CGIAR. The Panel cautions, however, that too rapid a shift to programs and program 
funding could jeopardize the operations of the centers, particularly if such shifts threaten 
the core skills and capacity a center would need to carry out high quality, long- 
research. 
3. Using the matrix as a base, a major effort should made under the leadership of the 
CGIAR Chair and the Finance Committee to obtain the commitment of donors to long 
term funding of the CGIAR, and to negotiate actively each year for the strongest 
commitments that can be obtained from each donor, including multi-year commitments. 
The new financing arrangements should encourage multi-year commitments from all 
donors, but tolerate annual financing procedures and varying forms and durations of 
commitments. 
4. The use of the matrix approach, in the context of the Panel’s preferred option for 
governance of the CGIAR Business Forum could facilitate the CGIAR’s agenda setting 
and fmd raising process as described in the Governance section above. 
5. The search for sources of additional funds, outside of the ODA area, while not likely 
to reduce ODA needs significantly in the short run, should nevertheless go forward. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Context and Conduct of the Study l 
In the report of the Oversight Committee, “CGIAR’s Governance and Organization: Is There 
Need for Change?” (May 6, 1994), the Committee suggested that a study be commissioned on the 
CGIAR’s governance, decision-making and financing arrangements. Following consultations during the 
Mid-Term Meeting (MTM) in New Delhi, the CGIAR Chairman appointed a Study Panel to examine and 
advise on these matters. 
The Panel’s terms of reference are: “to recommend a future governance, decision-making, and 
financing structure and mechanisms for the CGIAR, taking into account the long-term vision and 
objectives of the system and the consensus on these matters reached at MTM 94. ” The specific charge 
given to the Panel is to comment on at least the following issues: 
CGIAR's membership, deliberation, and decision-making structure; 
- participation of developing countries in the deliberations and decision-making mechanisms 
of the CGIAR; 
structure of CGIAR-IARC relationships in the future, including means of formulating and 
implementing system-wide policies and mechanisms of accountability; 
multi-year funding arrangements and negotiation processes; and, 
bds and options for formalization in the operations or status of the CGIAR as an 
organixation. 
In light of the complex nature of the issues, the Study Panel was constituted to bring together 
individuals with diverse stakeholder perspectives who are experienced in the functioning of the CGIAR, 
as well as external management experts who could bring in fresh viewpoints. Annex B provides biodata 
on the Panel members and the support team. 
The Panel met twice (over a three-week span) in Washington, DC, August 22-24 and September 
11-12, 1994. It began its work by brainstorming on major problems and issues the members considered 
as requiring attention, within the context of the Panel’s terms of reference. The issues identified fell into 
four broad, interrelated areas, which constitute the topics of the main chapters of this report: 
research agenda setting 
governance 
l l%e panel uses the term “agricultural research l throughout the report as a shorthand for research 
on agriculture, firestry, fisheries, and management of natural resources. l%e term CGUR refers to the 
Gmsultative Group, whereas “the System” or “CGUR system” refers to the entire enterprise which 
includes the Consultative Group and its secretariat, the centers, TAC and its secretariat, and the co- 
sponsors. 
- the CGIAR’s operating system 
funding the CGIAR research agenda 
The Panel saw research agenda setting as a natural star?ng point for the report as how agendas 
are set has a strong bearing on how the CGIAR and its operating system are organized. Issues of 
governance at the system level (e.g., the CGLWs membership structure and its decision-making system) 
are strongly linked with how the system is financed and how the centers operate. The manner in which 
the CGIAR’s operating system (i.e., the components that produce the CGIAR’s products and services) 
is organ&d and managed depends to a large extent on the content of the CGIAR’s research agenda and 
basic principles of governance. Finally, how the CGIAR is financed depends on what is to be financed 
(i.e., the research agenda) and the characteristics of the CGIAR’s governing and operating systems. 
The Panel benefitted from interactions with the CGIAR Chairman, who clarified the CGIAR’s 
expectations from the study, briefed the Panel about concepts introduced at the New Delhi meeting, and 
provided insights on strategy questions. Given the brief interim period between Panel meetings, it was 
not possible for the Panel, as a group, to interact with other stakeholders, which also would have been 
valuable. The Panel was fortunate, however, to have access to comprehensive documentation prepared 
by various bodies of the CGIAR on issues within the Panel’s purview. (See Annex C for a list of 
background documents.) 
The Panel members prepared a draft report after their first meeting and discussed it during their 
second. The outcome of these discussions led to the preparation of a summary of the Panel’s conclusions 
and recommendations, which were considered by the CGIAR Stakeholder Panel (chaired by MS. 
Swaminathan) and the CGIAR Steering Committee (chaired by I. Serageldin) during 13-16 September, 
1994. The full report was then revised in line with the summary document. The Panel members’ 
comments on the revised draft were considered by the Panel Chair and Secretary, who prepared the final 
version of the Panel’s report. 
The Panel has aimed to produce a brief document that brings together earlier work by the 
Oversight and Finance Committees, among others, and presents a coherent set of suggestions. The PaneI 
has not tried to tind answers to all governance and finance questions. It has seen its primary role as 
identifying issues, making some suggestions for the resolution of these issues, and indicating where 
further work is necessary. It should be noted that, in line with the mandate given to the Panel, the 
Panel’s recommendations are intended for the post 1995 period, i.e., following the completion of the 18- 
month transition period announced by the CGIAR Chairman at MTM 94. 
Starting Assumptions 
The Panel started its work with the premise that the CGIAR has been and is an effective 
organ&ion, with an enviable track record. Thus, the Panel did not see its role as “fixing” something 
which is non-functional. Instead, it interpreted its mandate as providing suggestions for making the 
CGIAR perform even better in the future. 
Second, the Panel began its work by agreeing on a set of key assumptions upon which their 
deliberations, and the report that follows, are based. These assumptions include the following: 
2 
1. Vision. A CGIAR vision statement is being prepared. Its goals will include the 
alleviation of poverty, food security, and protection of the environment; it will feature the need 
to improve the productivity of the resources committed to agriculture, forestry and fisheries - 
while protecting the environment - and will emphasize *he major role of improved technologies 
from agricultural research in achieving these aims. 
2. Global research. There will continue to be development issues and challenges that can 
be addressed most effectively through a well-coordinated international agricultural research 
system that will chiefly benefit developing countries as well as developed countries. me Panel 
uses the term “agricultural research” as a shorthand for a system not limited to agriculture only 
and one that includes research on forestry, fisheries, and management of natural resources.] 
3. Parznersws. Future research will be characterixed by a high degree of collaboration 
among several actors, one of which will be a strong CGIAR. 
4. Funding. The CGLU will continue to rely primarily on public funds. In order to 
remain competitive, the CGIAR will need to articulate its relevance and priorities clearly and 
demonstrate its efficiency and impact. 
5. Governance. The CGIAR’s future governance should be efficient and responsive to 
change. 
In the interests of preparing a short report, the Panel also assumes that the reader is familiar with 
the CGIAR’s research agenda setting processes, and its governance, financing and operating systems, or 
would refer to the documentation listed in Annex C for further information. 
II. RESEARCH AGENDA SETTING 
‘Ihe Panel has identified agenda setting as the starting point of its analysis because the future roles 
the CGIAR and its components could play in research agenda setting have major implications on its 
system of governance. 
‘The Panel makes a distinction between agenda setting at the global level and that for the 
CGIAR system only. The former relates to identifying global problems and the needs for international 
agricultural research, as well as clarifying the roles of various actors in the global scene. The latter takes 
as its starting point the global agenda. It then analyzes possible outputs by the System, alternative sources 
of supply for those outputs, opportunities through new science, and the probability of success for the 
various undertakings that could be considered. The outcome of the latter process is a set of priorities for 
the CGIAR and an allocation of responsibility for the various activities in the CGIAR’s agenda. To use 
the terminology introduced by the CGIAR Chairman at the New Delhi meeting, the global agenda for 
research is illustrated by the “actor x program matrix” in which the CGIAR is merely a row; whereas 
the CGIAR agenda is reflected by the “center x program matrix.” 
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Agenda Setting at the GbbaJ Level 
It is increasingly recognixed that certain research problems are truly global in nature (such as in 
the areas of germplasm and methodologies for natural resource nanagement). It is also clear that there 
are many agricultural research issues which are beat addressed at the international level but are not 
suitable for the agenda of the CGIAR. The benefits of international research accrue to both developed 
and developing countries, while no single institution is likely to possess all of the skills and facilities 
needed to address any major international research issue. 
It is for these reasons that the Panel has made a start.@ assumption that there will continue to 
be development issues and challenges that can be addressed most e&ctively through a well-coordinated 
international agricultural research system. This assumption begs the question: who would set the agenda 
of such a research system, and how would it be set? 
In the Panel’s view agenda setting at the global level is not the responsibility of any one actor or 
a set of actors. Agendas are set, instead, through the often independent actions of a host of actors. In 
this sense, the global research agenda is set through a marketplace for research where various actors 
carry out research depending on their assessment of research needs and availability of funds and other 
resources. The term “agenda setting” at the global level is therefore a misnomer, as the global agenda 
is more an outcome of independent action by multiple actors than the result of deliberate action by a few. 
Having said this, the Panel also believes that deliberate action to facilitate the exchange of 
information among the actors in the global research scene can help each actor, including the CGIAR, 
make more informed decisions about their research agendas and contribute to greater collaboration among 
the actors. 
The CGIAR is an important but small actor in the international agricultural research scene, 
accounting for only 4 percent of global expenditures on agricultural research. At times the CGIAR has 
had significant infkence on the global research agenda and that of other actors without ever dealing 
directly with global priorities as such. There are other actors, such as FAO and research systems and 
bodies in industrialized countries including the United States, France, Japan, Australia, United Kingdom, 
and the Netherlands. In addition, many universities in industrialized countries and some in developing 
countries are specializing on problems of tropical agriculture and agricultural development. Finally, 
national and regional agricultural research institutions and NGOs are playing stronger roles as leaders or 
partners of international agricultural research efforts. 
The institutional landscape for imemational agricultural research has been widening and becoming 
more complex. However, there is no global scientific forum where global research agenda issues are 
discussed with the participation of the major actors. True, the CGIAR serves as one such forum, but in 
the tinal analysis the CGIAR is more interested in the research agenda for its own operations than the 
global research agenda. This is in part because the present CGIAR forum does not incorporate all the 
major actors that would be needed for discussion of global agenda issues. It is also because it would not 
be efficient to discuss business issues concerning the CGIAR and global research agenda issues in the 
same forum. 
. The Pm that the CGIAR, with the resources of its members and the scientific capacity 
of its centers, has the strength and the competence to play a stronger leadership role in facilitating agenda 
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setting at the global level. In the past the CGJAR has been relatively inward-looking in its approach to 
global agenda issues. In the Panel’s opinion, this stance needs to change in the future. This means that 
the CGIAR would assume additional catalvtjc responsibilities in facilitating discussion of global research 
agenda issues by all key actors. 
Were the CGIAR to assume such a role, the new forum that would be initiated for discussion of 
global research agenda questions would also enable the CGIAR to subject its own planned agenda to the 
scrutiny of other actors. The same opportunity would be available to other key actors as well. 
The Panel m that, with the help of the cosponsors, the CGIAR play a catalytic 
leadership role in arranging a discussion among all of the major actors of the global research agenda 
which aims to: 
0 identify problems, describe progress, and establish needs for international 
agricultural research; 
0 assess and clarify global priorities; 
0 suggest roles for various actors; and, 
0 explore ways to strengthen alliances and partnerships. 
This recommendation has a strong beariig on questions of governance in the CGIAR, and the 
participation of developing countries in the CGIAR’s decision making, which are addressed below. 
Agenda Setting in the CGIAR 
Agenda setting withii the CGIAR involves the determination of programs that should be 
supported by the CGIAR (i.e., system-level planning and priority setting) and the identification specific 
programs and projects that should be implemented by each center (center-level planning and priority 
setting). TAC plays a critical role in this process and in monitoring the implementation of the agreed 
programs. The process is both bottom-up and top-down. Center inputs are received at various stages 
in the process, as are the donors. TAO analysis of global needs for research provides a broad macro 
priorities perspective within which individual center needs are examined. 
Two broad questions on agenda setting in the CGIAR have emerged recently. One relates to the 
determination of the System’s overarchmg goals (who should be involved), and the other to the scope of 
the research agenda. 
Regarding the former, some assert that developing countries must participate more fully in 
establishing the System’s overarching goals and strategies, and that the perspectives of peasants and 
farmers should be taken into account. Others are less certain, arguing that these must be largely 
determined by those who fund the System’s activities. Most agree, however, that developing countries 
must influence the choice of actions into which the overarching goals are translated. This would certainly 
enhance the legitimacy of the CGIAR and its actions. 
With respect to the scope of the research agenda, the CGIAR sets priorities, as noted above, 
mainly in terms of the activities it has identified for support. At times other activities are reviewed to 
see if they should appear in the CG portfolio of work. The Panel suggests that in the future the CGIAR 
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should work more closely with others in helping clarify a global agenda for all such research, and then 
consider for its support those activities in which it has a cost or quality advantage. 
Opportunities for Irnpr%ving Current Practices. Despite the improvements in recent years, 
the Panel is of the opinion that the process for setting the CGIAR research agenda can be further 
improved and that doing so will make the CGIAR more effective. Improvements are required in the 
bp devv, and in the evidence that primary 
As evidence that something is amiss, some point to the recent decline in funding for CGIAR 
activities and to the differing proportions in which recommended budgets are funded. In any case, the 
Panel considers that improvement in these three aspects would help strengthen the CGIAR. 
What Can Be Done. To enhance transw, a first step is to broaden consensus about the 
primary goals of poverty alleviation, food security, and pro&&g the environment. For example, whose 
poverty is of most concern, e.g., rural peoples only pc rural and urban, and are all levels of poverty of 
equal concern, e.g., how much more weight to the desperately poor than to the evidently poor. Also 
required is a sharper sense of the relative importance of each goal. Answers here can come from 
discussion of these issues in global fora as well as from the CGIAR itself. Although such discussion may 
not yield a consensus, it nevertheless would clarify the rationale for the diversity in views. 
With the goals made more specific, TAC, the centers, and others can more effectively set 
priorities among the many potential activities the System undertakes. All those involved will want to 
make explicit their assumptions about other critical elements in the decision making process, e.g., other 
suppliers and the probability of success. Some part of priority fixing would involve analysis and some 
part would involve judgement calls; care must be taken to report which is being employed. This done, 
recommendations can be more easily linked to goals. 
Partidpatlon by developing countries has important implications for agenda setting within the 
CGTAR and additional implications for other aspects, such as funding. Participation of developing 
countries in the CGIAR’s agenda setting processes will strengthen the identification of high priority 
problems, provide a more accurate sense of alternative sources of supply for the products needed, and 
yield better e&mates of probabilities of success. Beyond thii, evidence of participation will favor 
effective collaboration among NARS and centers. At this level participation enhances efficiency. Chapter 
3 of this report outlines some proposals for enhancing the participation of developing countries in the 
decision-making processes of the CGIAR. 
Evidence of aciency in pursuing the System’s primary goals lies first in demonstrating 
significant m in a timely way for the relevant poor or for critical environments through the products 
identified in the research agenda. (Note that while impact studies reveal most about work done in the past, 
they also suggest possibilities for the future because of what past impact implies about the quality of staff, 
about the supporting infrastructure, and about the culture which guides the energies involved.) 
Obviously, significant amounts of time must pass before significant impacts can be expected. In the . . interim, donors and clients can be reassured about efficiency through evenhanded of the 
quality and relevance of the science being employed and through assurances that the work underway aims 
at the high priority products of the agenda. In addition, given the emerging sense that science is 
frequently most effectively practiced in m with others, evidence of such collaboration will 
reassure funders and clients about efficiency. 
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Progress in transparency, participation and efficiency will not only improve the process of agenda 
setting within the CGIAR but will also have implications for other challenges facing the system in 
governance, operations, and funding. We leave these points until later in the report. We also leave for 
later discussion possible changes in the roles of prominent actors as the CGIAR’s governance and agenda 
setting are modified. 
Thus, the Panel wncluda that the CGIAR’s current agenda setting practices must be improved 
through greater transparency, expanded participation by developing wuntries, more evidence of efficiency 
in pursuing primary CGIAR goals. 
III. GOVERNANCE 
Background 
‘Ihe CGIAR has been governed by the same principles that were laid down at the inception of 
the Group in 1971. The success and rapid growth of the System is one proof that there was much merit 
in these principles. Above all, they include non-political operation strengtluwd by independent 
technical advice, consensus decision-making, informality and flexibility in operations, center 
autonomy, and donor sovereignty. In its previous discussions of governance and decision-making 
issues, the CGIAR has reaffirmed its strong support of these basic guiding values. The Panel’s wmments 
on governance, summarized below, are made in recognition of the significance of retaining these 
principles. 
Since the establishment of the CGIAR, however, there have been significant changes in the 
political arena within which the CGIAR operates, including a conceptual shift in development thinking. 
These changes include (1) increased recognition that research collaboration is essential for success; (2) 
a stronger role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) both of developed and developing 
wuntries; and, (3) orientation of development aid beyond food production to poverty alleviation and 
protection of the environment. The CGIAR’s future governance structure needs to be studied in full 
recognition of these changes. 
Key Governance Concerns 
The Panel’s assessment of the principal considerations that should be taken into account in 
identifying options for the future governance structure of the CGIAR are summarized below. 
1. Expansion and its consequences. The CGIAR has expanded substantially over the last 
two decades. This is reflected by the increases in the number of centers, donors, and the annual budget 
for the system’s wre operations. Coordiig the operations of the CGIAR has also become a time 
wnsuming process, as reflected by the increase in the number of CGIAR-level wmmittees. The 
complexity of the CGIAR has increased, and the analysis and documentation needed to address that 
complexity has grown apace. The number of days required for conducting the CGIAR’s business has 
grown immoderately. 
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2. Informality. The informality of the Group bw been a great asset for efficiency and 
stimulated discussion. Over time, the original dialogue between centers and funders in the CGIAR forum 
has, however, almost disappeared and time wnstraints have virtually squeezed centers off the floor at 
official meeting. 
At the New Delhi meeting the CGIAR reafIirmed the importance it attaches to wllegiality and 
informality in its deliberations. Nevertheless, some members of the Group wntinue to believe that it 
would be better for the CGIAR to wnstitute itself as a formal intemational organization. Ihe following 
reasons are among the arguments usually made to support this change. 
playing a strong leadership role in the intemationai scene; 
speaking authoritatively and with one voice for the System as a whole; 
entering into formal agreements with other organizations; and, 
adhering to a commonly agreed set of decision rules in its work procedures. 
A background note was prepared for the Panel on issues involved in establishing the CGIAR as 
an international organixation (see Annex A). It is argued in this note that formalizing the CGIAR is not 
necessarily the right answer to the concerns outlined above. 
Panel concludes t&.t . . . the CGIAR should not seek to be establlsged as an mte& 
preanization so 1onP as it can achieve its obiectives efficientlv under an informal framework, However, 
as it has in the past, it should wntinue to introduce formal procedures as needed for good business 
practice under the current informal setting. Collegiality and informality are valued traits of the CGIAR, 
which are much admired by other international undertakings, that should be preserved to the extent 
possible. 
3. A non-political, scientific organization. The non-political nature of the CGIAR and the 
fact that it is advised by a technical advisory committee made up of experts serving in their personal 
capacity have always been seen as assets. These have been much praised, in particular within the Group 
itself. 
In the early years of the CGIAR the System’s focus was on using science to tind ways of 
increasing food production; the centers were less involved with politically-laden issues. The changes in 
the debate on development and poverty and the increased emphasis on germplasm conservation and 
intellectual property rights (IPR) have introduced a stronger political element to the discussions within 
and outside the CGIAR. The CGIAR-financed research agenda now includes themes that exceed the 
traditional area of agriculture and food production and which relate more directly to values and political 
priorities (e.g., preservation of the environment). This raises the issue of the extent to which the CGIAR 
should get engaged with political questions. 
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4. Autonomy of the centers. Carrying out the CGIAR’s activities through a set of legally 
autonomous intemationaI centers has been a widely accepted principle. Although clarification of the 
CGIAR’s research agenda in terms of a center x program matrix introduces some complications on 
managing programs versus centers (see Chapter 4), it would be safe to assume that a large portion of the 
activities supported by the CGIAR would be carried out autonomously by the centers. 
The flip side of autonomy is accountability. The CGIAR should continue to balance the 
autonomy of the centers with a strong system of accountability. In addition, there is a growing need for 
wider collaboration between CGIAR institutions and other organizations, emerging, in part, from the 
growing interdependence among institutions worldwide, and also from the opportunities for greater impact 
and efficiency that wuld result from such collaboration. 
. . . ese wnsrderattons lead the Panel to conclupeteaf the CGIAR should come to caq out I& . . . . . 
m man@ ~zmanlv bv an accountab le network of 
&rnational centers, 
5. Ownership of the System. The CGIAR was originally a group of donor representatives 
who decided to meet annually in the form of a “wnsultative group,” wllectively supporting aimed 
towards increasing food production in developing wuntries. This image of the CGIAR beii a “club of 
donors” still exists, although developing wuntries have begun to be increasingly involved as 
donors/funders. Scientists and managers ftom developing countries have, however, been much involved 
from the beginning of the CGIAR as members of the Board of Trustees, scientists at the IARCs, members 
of TAC and other wmmittees, etc. There is a growing sentiment within the CGIAR that, in the future, 
the need for increased collaboration among various actors would necessitate the broadening of the “club” 
to more directly incorporate the concerns of “users.” 
The Panel considers that under the present arrangements developing wuntries do not participate 
effectively in the CGIAR’s decision-making. The arrangements neither allow for frank and accurate 
representation of views and needs of developing wuntries, nor do they foster a strong sense of ownership 
of the CGIAR System by developing wuntries. 
The issue of representation and participation by developing wuntries within the CGIAR should 
be seen at two different levels: 
0 At the technical and scientific level the need is in greater mobilization of human talent, 
resources, and specific knowledge which exists in developing countries, and in promoting 
a sense of partnership and ownership of CGIAR activities by developing wuntries. 
0 At the political level the need is in securing support for the System by the developing 
countries (essential for wntinued funding and long-term viability of the System), which 
demands wider involvement of developing wuntries in the setting of priorities and 
identifying long term needs. 
-es that the wvemance structure of the CGIAR should allow for mu& 
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increased ownership of the system bv develonine countries, 
Governance options 
The Fad considers the following five as distinct options the CGIAR might wish to consider for 
the future governance of the System. These are presented below in an order ranging from the least to 
the most formal, in the sense that the last option presented reflects the case of the CGIAR becoming an 
intemational organ&ion. 
option 1: Inhmai CGIAR with two standing committees 
This option refkts a return to the arrangements that existed prior to the New Delhi meeting, i.e., 
an Oversight and a Finance Committee making recommendations to the CGIAR for action. All other 
components of the CGIAR would operate as now. Representatives from developing countries would be 
selected through the FAO regional conferences under the new arrangements recommended by the 
Oversight Committee upon consultation with FAO. 
option 2: Continuation of the present arrangements, with minor adjustments 
This option refers to extending indefinitely the governance arrangements agreed by the CGIAR 
for the interim period (i.e., until the transition is completed through 1995). This differs from Option 1 
only with the addition of a Steering Committee, made up of the membership of the Oversight and Finance 
Committees and having the same termsof-reference as the two standing committees. The Steering 
Committee would essentially function as a joint Oversight and Finance Committee, meeting under the 
chainnanshi of the CGIAR Chair. 
There are two adjustments that could be considered. First, the CGIAR would delegate decision- 
making authority to the Steering Committee in some areas. Second, the Oversight and Finance 
Committees could function as proper sub-committees of the Steering Committee. 
option 3: Global and regional fora and a business forum 
Under this option, the CGIAR, with the support of the cosponsors, would take the lead to . Armcultural Research fo r DeveloDmem and &gional Fora on Aericultur~ 
In addition, it would have a separate business forum where the CGIAR’s 
internal business would be conducted. This option would allow separation of the discussion of global and 
regional research agenda issues which concern many stakeholders, from conducting the business of the 
CGIAR. 
The creation of a Global Forum could be consistent with various forms of the Business Forum. 
The most appropriate structure in the eyes of the Panel is as follows: membership in the CGIAR would 
be limited to cosponsors, representatives from developing countries, and countries or institutions financing 
the CGIAR’s core activities through a cash contribution above a fixed minimum level. Participation of 
developing countries within the business forum would be enhanced by allowing countries hosting the 
headquarters of CGIAR centers to become members (with some conditions), allowing groups of countries 
to pool their resources to become members, and intensifying efforts to recruit other beneficiary countries 
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to become members. 
The decision-making structure of the CGIAR would include two or more standing committees, 
a CGIAR Bureau (including the CGIAR Chair, cosponsors, and the chairs of standing committees) as an 
informal consultation mechanism on major issuea which may arise between meetings, and a Mid-Term 
Meeting (M’T’M) of the CGIAR as a critical business session. 
Option 4: Tuning the CGIAR itself into a global forum 
Under this option the CGIAR would extend membership to all countries wishing to join, with or 
without financial conttibutions to the CGIAR-sponsored operations. An arrangement like the one recently 
adopted by the Global Enviromnent Facility (GEF), the large CGIAR forum would meet every two or 
three years to discuss major policy and priority questions. The real business of the CGIAR would be 
wnducted through an elected Executive Committee, with represent&ion from donor members and non- 
donor members. De&ion rules such as double majority (e.g., over half the donors and half the total 
membership) could protect the interests of major stake&older groups within the Executive Committee. 
Some formalization would be necessary to establish the new forum and its operating procedures. 
Option 5: Turning the CGIAR into an international organization 
Under this option the status of the CGIAR would be changed from an informal association to an 
international organixation. There are several possibilities here, as identified in Annex A. These range 
from an organ&ion which takes over the tasks now performed by all the major components of the 
CGIAR, including TAC and the centers, to one which covers only the functions carried out by the 
existing CGIAR. The new CGIAR could have universal membership (i.e., similar to that in UN 
organixations), or restricted membership (such as limited only to donors). Lie most other imemational 
organixations, the new CGIAR would have a plenary body, a restricted body (such as an executive 
committee), and a chief executive. 
Assessment and Recommendation 
The Panel’s earlier comments suggest the type of criteria it favors for comparing these governance 
options. These include the following desirable features: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Maintaining the CGIAR’s non-political character; 
Preserving infonnallty; 
Assuming a leadership role in global agenda setting; 
Ensuring active participation of all relevant actors in the CGIAR’s own agenda 
&tlng; 
Promoting interdependence among research actors; 
Broadening the ownership of the CGIAR to its major users and beneficiaries; 
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7. Increasing the efflclea~cy and transparencs of conducting the CGIAR’s business and 
improving its responsiveness to change; 
8. Improving the stability of the CGIAR’s tinames; 
9. Frotecting center autonomy; and, 
10. Protecting donor sovereignty. 
its future mce structure, 
The following outhnes the Panel’s rationale in reaching this conclusion: 
Option 1 provides only a minimum governance structure and has been tried and broadly accepted 
by the CGIAR. However, it continues to keep the CGIAR inward-looking and barely meets the 
considerations noted under 3 through 6, above. Besides, this option represents a step back from the 
decisions taken at New Delhi. 
Option 2 suffers from the same disadvantages as option 1, except that it is not a step backward. 
It embodies the Steering Committee concept, which some have found objectionable if it were to operate 
as an executive committee, with decision-making powers between CGIAR meetings. 
Option 4 presents the risk of politicixmg the CGIAR by mixing in one forum all major 
stakeholders. Despite the protections offered by voting systems like double majority, this option would 
reduce the current level of sovereignty of the donors. Also, the added formalization introduced by this 
option would likely increase the level of bureaucracy (and decrease efficiency). 
Option 5 has several sub-options. Amalgamating all CGIAR components into one International 
organization would create a large bureaucracy, particularly if it were to have universal membership. 
Neither center autonomy nor donor sovereignty would be protected. If only the Consultative Group were 
to become an international organixation, the CGIAR could lose its flexibility, at varying degrees 
dependiig on membership and decision-making structures. 
Option 3, the recommended option, meets all the criteria mentioned above, with the possible 
exception of efficiency in conducting the CGIAR’s business. Although separating the business function 
from the global forum u enhance efficiency, organizing and managing the global and regional fora 
could be costly. This is a matter that should be studied carefully, in the light of the experience of the 
World Bank, FAO, UNDP and other organixations in setting up similar global and regional fora. 
Description of the Recommended Option 
Under this option, the CGIAR would adopt a two-tier deliberation and decision-making structure 
made up of a Global/Regional Fora and a Business Forum. The Global and Regional Fora would bring 
openness to the CGIAR, help build consensus on needs, and facilitate collaboration. The business of the 
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CGIAR would be conducted within the Business Forum. 
The three fora would essentially work as follows: 
1. Q&III Few. The CGIAR would, with the support of the cosponsors, organize a 
Global Forum on Agricultural Rewardi for Development. The forum would include all actors 
involved with such research and would aim to: 
0 identify problems, describe progress, and establish needs for international agricultural 
research; 
0 assess and clarify global priorities; 
0 suggest roles for various actors; and, 
0 explore ways to strengthen alliances and partnerships. 
The GIobai Forum would meet once every two years. Although the timing could be variable, 
organizing it just prior to the fall business meeting of the CGIAR might be efficient in terms of ensuring 
donor participation and carryover of conclusions to the business meeting. 
The forum would consist of representatives of governments, international organizations, donor 
agencies, non government organixations and research institutions including NABS and CGIAR centers, 
all of whom would participate on an equal basis. Each participating institution would cover its own costs, 
although donors might wish to make arrangements to facilitate the participation of some developing 
country institutions. 
In the Panel’s view TAC should serve as advisor to the forum. TAC’s analysis of global 
priorities could form the agenda for the forum every 6 years. Agendas in other years would focus on 
one or more themes of international research. 
2. wonal Forq that meet the needs and interests of each region, and are coordinated with 
existing similar efforts, could be a valuable complement to the Global Forum. These fora would be 
organized under the auspices of the cosponsors and regional organizations. It would be desirable for 
CGIAR members with interests and capacity in a region (such as the regional development banks and the 
regional arms of global institutions) to take the lead in organizing these fora. International centers and 
NABS from the region would be expected to participate. There would also be some form of TAC 
participation. 
These fora would aim to: 
identify regional problems and needs for international research programs; 
clarify regional priorities and roles of actors (including the CGIAR centers and 
NAW; 
explore ways of strengthening alliances and partnerships; and, 
recommend policies. 
The Regional Fora would meet on an as w in years alternate to the Global Forum. 
Existing organixations and fora (such as SPAAR) could be closely linked with (or serve as substitute for) 
the CGIAR Fora. This would strengthen links between the CGIAR and initiatives like SPAAR. 
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3. &&ssFa . The business forum of the CGIAR, i.e., the Consultative Group 
itself, should be constituted of: 
representatives from developing countries; and, 
countries or institutions fmancing activities within the CGIAR’s approved agenda 
through an annual cash contribution above a fixed minimum level. (The Panel 
did not recommend a change in the present minimum of $500,000 a year.) 
To remain as members, all donors should satisfy the System’s required minimum contributions. 
The Panel notes that the Global Forum would have some influence on agenda setting and policy 
formulation for the CGIAR, and enhance to some degree the participation of developing countries in that 
process. The CGL4.R should take the fkrllowing additional measures to enhance developing country 
participotion within the business forum: 
3.1 Co~~~triea hosting the headquarters of CGIAR cxdem should be encouraged to 
become members of the CGIAR, with the proviso that the minimum cash contributions 
required from them would be one-half the level required from other members. 
3.2 Groups of countries should be allowed to pool their resources to me& the minimum 
contribution requirement and have a single membership in the CGIAR. 
3.3 Through high level wntacts, efforts should be intensified to encourage other beneficiary 
countries to become members. 
The Panel notes that the steps recommended above would increase the ownership of the CGIAR 
by developing countries. The cosponsors should review progress in this area and assess if there continues 
to be need to complement representation of developing country views by members making financial 
contributions with the mechanism of selecting regional representatives. 
.2 The Panel has considered two options. The CGIAR 
would have a set of standing committees under both options. 
Qption 1: To elect a Steering Committee to conduct the CGIAR’s business between CGIAR 
meetings. The Steering Committee would be chaired by the CGIAR Chair and 
would have one or more standing sub-committees (such as on fmance and 
oversight.) 
The CGIAR would meet once annually. The Mid-Term Meeting would be 
2 It might be usejid to underline one feature of the CGUR 3 present &cision-making system. Under 
the present consensus decision-making system, the decisions reached by the CGUR are as they are sewed 
and articulated by the CGUR Chair at the conclusion of CGUR meetings. l%e C&air of the committees 
of the CGUR do not make decisions for the CGUR. But the work by the C3air and the committees 
facilitates the fotmation of con.sen.w on issues, which speeds decision-making at the meetings of the 
CGUR. 
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replaced with a meeting of the Steering Committee. 
This option would essentially continue the present Steering Committee 
arrangement, with the exception that the CGIAR would explicitly delegate powers 
to the Steering Committee to enable it act for the CGIAR between the annual 
meetings. 
-2: There would be no Steering Committee with delegated powers as in Option 1. 
But, the CGIAR would form from its membership one or more standing 
wmmitteea (such as on finance and oversight) to facilitate the handling of its 
business. The current Mid-Term Meeting would take place, but with the 
attendance of a relatively small group, such as in the form of an Executive 
Session attended by the heads of member delegations, representatives from 
developing countries, and (as observers) the chairs of CBC and CDC. Standing 
wmmittees would be able to conduct their business in parallel sessions and report 
to the whole CGIAR during the same week. CGIAR members who are not 
members of standing committees would be organ&d into one or more ad 
committees to handle some of the substantive items on the agenda (such as 
external reviews). 
The chairs of the standing CGIAR committees and the cosponsors would meet 
under the chairman&ip of the CGIAR Chair as a CGIAR Bureau to consult on 
mqjor Issues which may arise between the two CGIAR meetings. 
The Panel’s preference is for Option 2, which, among other advantages, could facilitate the 
CGIAR’s agenda se&g process as described and illustrated in Chapter 5. In essence, the MTM would 
gain in significance as it would be at this meeting that the CGIAR would agree on the research agenda 
and financing plan for the following year, leaving the period between MTM and ICW to negotiations with 
donors on the financing of the agreed agenda. 
Implications of the Recommended Governance Structure 
The future governance structure recommended above has several implications on the roles of the 
existing components of the CGIAR. The Panel’s views on this are covered below. 
u. As r&firmed by the CGIAR at MTM94, TAC would continue to play an important role 
in the CGIAR. The governance recommendations, and particularly the addition of the Global Forum add 
significantly to the burdens on TAC, which would need to provide increased inputs not only concerning 
the research agenda of the CGIAR proper, but also concerning the global agricultural research agenda 
which would be considered regularly by the Forum. Thii has implications for the number and type of 
members on TAC, and for the length and complexity of the TAC agenda. It also has implications for 
the type of analytic support needed by TAC to play the enhanced role. 
In the Panel’s view the institutional resources of the System and its partners should provide 
supportive analytic services to TAC. This includes CGIAR centers working on global policy and 
management issues, as well as partners such as FAO, the World Bank, and other organizations. The 
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proposed new workload for TAC would not be wholly additional, since the priority exercise has always 
been conducted in a global context. 
A second implication for TAC, which arisea leas from the governance proposals than it does from 
the related approach to funding the agenda, is the gradual shift recommended from the center focus to 
a program focus in terms of strategy and monitoring. This might indeed have an intluence on the types 
of individuals most useful in TAC discussions away from those with an institutional focus and toward 
scientists capable of reviewing programs of work on a more technical basis. The content of the programs 
will, of course, determine the specific skills required on TAC. 
Finally, there is the goal of enhancing developing country participation in the CGIAR. TAC is 
an important mechanism for this participation in three ways: 
With half of its members from developing countries, TAC takes aboard a developing country 
view directly in its deliberations. The option recommended does not call for a change here, 
although the quality of TAC members chosen for their personal qualifications will remain a key 
element of making the system work effectively. Ability to hear and interpret developing country 
voices could perhaps be given increased weight in the choice of TAC members whatever their 
national origin. 
TAC’s work program can give greater weight to the issue of relevance of research to developing 
country needs than it does already, by giving increased attention to that aspect of its range of 
reviews, and mounting further direct studies of the issue as in the present look at IARC-NARS 
relationships in West Africa. This would be of significance in both the Global Forum and the 
Regional Fora. 
Direct consultations with NARS leadership, such as that recently held in West Africa, might be 
done more often and more systematically, possibly through the recommended Regional Forum 
mechanism. 
mnsom. The Panel Cosponsors play several extremely important roles within the CGIAR. 
sees an increased, not reduced role for the cosponsors, although that role might be played to some extent 
through the proposed Bureau rather than independently. 
First, the recommended Global Forum should be organized under the auspices and leadership of 
FAO, UNDP, and the World Rank. Their leadership would bring legitimacy to the Forum and help 
avoid politicization of the Forum. 
Second, the Regional Fora should also be organized under the auspices of FAO, UNDP, and the 
World Bank. However, here the leadership and organixational responsibility should be shared with other 
relevant CGIAR donors (such as regional banks) and regional organizations. 
Third, the cosponsors should continue to nominate the members of TAC and serve as a search 
and selection panel for the TAC chair. These roles may need to be reviewed if the CGIAR were to give 
nominations responsibilities to one of its standing committees. 
Fourth, the CGIAR should consider expanding the cosponsors group to include UNEP which 
carries responsibilities in key mandate areas of the CGIAR. 
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. w. ‘I%e Secretariat would continue to service the CGIAR, its chair, and 
committee(s). Grganixation of Giobal and Regional Fora meetings would be a major addition to the 
workload of the Secretariat. This responsibility could be shared with other organizations, particularly 
in the case of the regional fora. 
IV. OPERATING SYSTEM 
‘Ihe operating system, that is the set of institutions and mechanisms by which the CGIAR actually 
produces its output, enters the Panel’s specific mandate in two ways. The terms of reference covers: 
- “the structure of CGIAR-IARC relationships in the future, including means of formulating and 
implementing system-wide policies and mechanisms of accountability,” 
- needs and options for formalization in the operations or status of the CGIAR as an 
organization. ” 
These elements of the scope of work are addressed in part in other sections of the report, and in 
part below. ‘Ihe Panel found that some of its recommendations on governance and finance have 
implications for the operating system, which need to be spelled out even though they go beyond the 
specifics of the mandate. Moreover, some issues posed in relation to governance, such as participation 
of developing countries in the CGIAR, can also be addressed through the operating system. 
Operating Implications of the Matrix 
The matrix approach to defining and funding the CGIAR research agenda, which the CGIAR 
decided to adopt at MTM94, while not part of the operating system as such, nevertheless defines the 
context for that system into the future. For this reason, a discussion of the operating system needs to 
start with a description of the matrix and some of its implications. 
The matrix approach would define the CGIAR research agenda over a period of years in two 
dimensions. Across the top would be a set of carefully defined program areas, for each of which there 
would be a clear statement of goals, time limited objectives, and expected impact. Down the side would 
be the institutions charged by the CGIAR with the primary role in implementing research in the program 
areas, namely the centers supported by the CGIAR. The program areas would be defined in such a way 
as to allow charaderization of the CGIAR’s research agenda in terms of few (say five or six) program 
areas, which could be subdivided as required into thii or more programs. 
Tke Panel foresees that when introduced for 1996 the matrix will have immediate impact on the 
operating system. It would be some years, however, before the matrix approach exerts its Nl intluence 
over both the operations of the System, and the responses of donors. The impact of the new governance 
structure on the research agenda will only be realii once the new mechanisms are in place and 
functioning. other reasons for the gradual realization of the potential of the matrix include the time that 
will be required to elaborate the content of the program areas, the time required to bring on stream the 
management systems for operating programs, and the long decision cycle in most donor agencies. 
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At some future point, when the matrix approach is functioning fully, the CGIAR might be viewed 
as funding a set of programs, and franchising the implementation of these programs to a select set of 
centers to which it provides essential core support and oversight. The CGIAR reviews would increasingly 
focus on e&ctiveneas in implementing programs, with decreasing attention to details of center 
management. The terms of the franchises, and the institutions receiving them would be adjusted over 
time in response to performance and to the changing needs of the research agenda. In addition to the 
franchised centers, the action units of the system would include operating programs, themselves made 
up of centers and/or other institutions, principally national institutions in developing countries. These 
changes have obvious and important implications for the freedom of action of the centers, and generally 
for the relationships between the CGIAR and the centers which will occur by degrees over time. 
ThePad ~that the CGI.h gradually move towards a pmpmhml operating 
system, with a select number of cmters as franchised institutions. 
Managing System-wide Initiatives 
While a large share of the research falling within program areas will continue to be managed in 
the traditional way by individual centers, it seems clear that there will be an increasing role in the future 
for what the Panel has called “operating programs,” which are included in what TAC calls “systemwide 
initiatives. ” There is little experience so far with the management of CGIAR financed programs linking 
several centers and/or other institutions, but what experience there is suggests that the complex nature 
of such programs will require ingenious approaches to avoid inefficiency and high costs. In addition, new 
methods of monitoring and evaluation will be required for such programs, which will not be covered 
adequately by a monitoring system focussed on centers. 
Various models of management include the use of a lead or convening center with an explicit 
division of labor among participants, collective management through a committee, management by a 
single center (or by an entity established principally for that purpose) with other participants in 
subordinate roles, or some variation of a network approach. No single management formula will apply 
to all cases, but in each case there needs to be clear responsibility for program leadership and 
accountability for program performance. 
Issues that need to be resolved in choosing and applying management models include: 
means for ensuring aI participants, centers and others, that their needs are considered on 
an equal basis with those of the managing entity; 
evaluating the costs of collaboration in programs, and the means for ensuring that the 
partners are compensated for costs except those they agree to meet themselves; 
identifying relatively low cost methods of conducting effective collaboration within 
programs; and, 
creating incentive systems encouraging participating researchers to value the total 
enterprise above their personal interests or those of their own organixation. 
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The gov- and management of programs involving several partners will present a fresh 
challenge to the System and one which may have various answers. The Panel recommends that: 
a. there should be clear kadership responslbilit~ and accountability for each program, 
in most cases through a lead center; 
b. propusals for program management and coordination should come from the lead 
institution(s), and should be appraised by TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat before 
approval for funding beyond an initial phase; and, 
C. once a program is in full operation, it should be subjected to external monitoring and 
review of its scientific and management aspects as well as relevance and impact, through 
processes devised by TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat. 
The appraisal recommended in (b), above, is to ensure that the program coordination and 
management mechanisms proposed are sound. Such an appraisal could lead to modification of proposals 
before they are submitted to the CGIAR for consideration. 
Centers 
The shift to a program focus in funding will have significant but presently uncertain implications 
for center management of research, and for the roles of boards and their program committees. New ways 
of operating the CGIAR System will place new demands and constraints on centers and may, in some 
cases, reduce center autonomy. 
In particular, these changes will require center boards to build new strengths. In addition to their 
overall responsibility for the operations of the centers; some boards may be assigned the added 
responsibility to oversee the execution of CGIAR programs. This, when coupled with the likelihood that 
a shift in the direction of programs within the CGIAR could lead to a reduction in the emphasis the 
System gives to institutional evaluations of centers, elevates the pressures on each board to strengthen its 
capacity to handle the new and the old tasks expected of them. 
‘Ihe boards have been singled out in the comment above both because they are the highest 
authority in the responsibility chain, and because some donors feel that CGIAR boards, in general, need 
to improve the performance of their current duties. The center directors will naturally be expected to 
continue providing leadership to their centers, and some also to the CGIAR programs for which their 
center has the management or coordination responsibility. 
Action to strengthen the boards should remain on the agenda of the Oversight Committee, and 
any future successor. Specific lines of action could include greater attention to the selection of CGlAR 
nominees on boards, improvement of the ability of the Candidate Information Service to evaluate board 
potential of individuals, a more effective effort to inform new board members of what the CGIAR expects 
from them, increased opportunities for board members from different centers to exchange experiences, 
and more initiative taken to keep all board members, not just directors general and board chairs, informed 
about CGIAR business. 
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The Panel m greater efforts to find quality board members and provide them with 
the information and other support needed to perform their critical responsibilities. 
Center boards, almost half of the membership of which are nationals of developing countries, are 
also places where developing country inputs can be brought to bear more effectively on the CGIAR at 
its cutting edge. What is involved is some change in the approach taken by boards to their 
responsibilities, and more care in the selection of members. The Panel does not agree with the suggestion 
that developing country governments or institutions should have increased formal representation on 
boards, beyond the host country representation which is typically the norm. A step of this kind could 
change the nature of the centers for the worse, by introducing political concerns into management. 
The Panel m that center hoards redouble their efkrts to serve as vehicles through 
which deweloping eountq concerns are considered in decision-making about center research programs. 
Aside from board participation, the breadth and quality of center interaction with developing 
cmmtry research institutions and with developing country governments warrants attention over coming 
years. Among the aspects to be addressed, in addition to diffusion of research results through application 
by NAP!& are: the possibilities of devolution of functions to NAPS (either with or without funding); 
collaboration in joint programs; and systematic consultation in the process of priority setting by centers. 
The issue of how to organize efkient liaison between a group of CGIAR centers and a particular national 
system, also needs to be addressed vigorously. 
Enhancing Effectiveness and Impact 
Future support for the CGIAR and its centers will depend on the ability of the centers to 
demonstrate their effectiveness and impact. The imperative is one of survival for the centers and 
credibility for the system. 
For present purposes, es= is detined as the ability of the system to produce relevant 
information and technology (high quality outputs) in a timely and cost-effective way (efficiency or value 
for money). Impact. on the other hand, is measured by the uptake, use and desirable m of the 
products of research on production, poverty alleviation and other development objectives. Outputs can 
be specified and measured as they occur; impact is often assessed at a different location and time. 
venw is very much under the control of the CGIAR and its centers, while &J& is more 
dependent on external factors, i.e., those outside its direct control. However, the CGIAR will 
increasingly need to understand and influence these external processes and to demonstrate its effectiveness- 
in order to sustain its leading position and intemational standing. The CGIAR system should, therefore: 
continue to strengthen its skills in policy formulation, and its understanding of social 
concerns and of development issues and problems; 
represent itself at international debates and be responsive to international concerns and 
plans of action; 
develop its skills in the fields of dissemination and its partnerships in the processes of 
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problem analysis, demand identification, adaptation, uptake and impact; and, 
develop credible output and performance measures and evaluation systems. 
There is a considerable amount of literature available within the CGIAR and elsewhere on factors 
which i.nfIuence the effectiveness and impact of research. Clear identification of beneficiaries and their 
involvement in research planning and implementation; establishing well-articulated objectives on 
researchable problems; employing an interdisciplinary approach; effective dissemination of results in an 
accessible format; purposeful partnerships; and efficient resource management are the most common 
conclusions of most of the analyses. 
The current system of External Program and Management Reviews, together with the quality 
controlling and priority setting functions of TAC, and the organixational and financial scrutiny of the 
Secretariat have served the CGIAR well. They have been responsive to the changing and sometimes 
divergent needs of the CGIAR. They have sustained “confidence” within the donor community, but the 
system is orientated towards Center-based activities. 
The movement toward operating programs that may involve several centers and other partners 
will require a somewhat different system of direction, efficiency assurance and impact assessment. It also 
provides an opportunity to review the roles, division of labor and responsibilities between players in the 
CGIAR. 
It will be in the Centers’ interest to demonstrate their effectiveness and efficiency in the use of 
resources and in sustaining their comparative advantage by working with their partners. It is in the 
Donors’ interest to demonstrate that the system makes effective use of its resources and that it has a 
positive impact on development processes. ‘Ihe CGIAR system will need, therefore, to take a greater 
interest in the design and implementation of programs, dissemination and uptake of outputs and evaluation 
of the impact of the products of the system. The system’s instruments for monitoring and evaluation 
should reduce their involvement with the internalmanagement of the Centers and judge them by results. 
There have been periodic evaluations of the impact of the CGIAR’s activities but these have tended to 
be ‘ad hoc’ and system-driven. 
Should there be CGIAR-wide output measures and performance indicators? Experience elsewhere 
casts doubt on the value of such, as both the outputs and hence the indicators will vary with the program, 
center and activity. 
The panel m the mounting of a systemwide effort, with inputs from TAC, the CGIAR 
Secretariat and the centers, to develop systematic and continuous processes for impact assessment, to 
supplement existing processes for: 
- ensuring reIevance of CGIAR activities; 
- output measures and performance indicators; 
- performance incentives; 
- monitoring programs; and, 
- conducting ex-post evaluations 
for discussion and endorsement by the CGIAR. 
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Partnerships 
The move towards demand-led programs to address development issues, and the need to identify 
clear objectives, involve beneficiaries in the design and implementation of research as well as the adaption 
and uptake of results and technology, makes it even more important for the CGIAR at all levels, and 
particularly the centers to identify and work with ‘partners*. 
Partnership should be seen as a means for improved effectiveness and impact, and not an end in 
itself. Partnerships should be purposeful or demand-led and based on the relative comparative advantages 
of the partners - namely who does what best and most efficiently. 
Partnerships could be a tool to improve the relevance and ownership of research activities; 
facilitate d-on, uptake and hence impact of the results; enhance participation; develop 
constituencies; increase efliciency in the use of resources; spread or minimize risk, and strengthen the 
continuum between strategic, applied and adaptive research. Partnerships can also help strengthen NAPS 
and avoid duplication. 
The centers form partnerships with a wide range of bodies: other centers, developed and 
developing country research institutions, universities, non-governmental organizations, UN bodies and 
the private and commercial sectors. However, in forming consortia or collaborative links, it is necessq 
for the centers and the CGIAR to ensure that there are clear objectives and responsibilities, and that 
intellectual property issues are considered and clarified at the outset. 
The Panel Fecommends that CGIAR provide incentives for the formation of prodtive 
partners~ps - including those among CGIAR centers - and ensure that funding systems are adjusted 
to facilitate these collaborative modes of working. Consortia and partnerships need to be built on the 
win-win principle, and must avoid the danger of forming introverted ‘cartels’. The objective must be for 
the CGIAR to become more extrovert in its mode of operation and accotmtable to a wider constituency 
through partnerships. 
V. FUNDINGTHE CGIAR RESEARCHAGENDA 
The scope of work given the Panel in the area of finance was limited to: financing structure and 
mechanisms for the CGIAR, with a focus on multi-year funding arrangements and negotiation processes. 
It is appropriate that the Panel’s role in relation to finance be limited, given the large number of bodies 
and agencies addressing this topic. Nevertheless, with the objective of helping to promote greater 
predictability and stability of funding, and a better match between the research agenda and funds 
supporting it, the Panel decided to consider a broad range of finance issues and possible solutions. 
The Nature of the Challenge 
In a context of increasing dif&culties faced to obtain ODA funds for research, and particularly 
for agricultural research, in recent years the CGIAR has experienced a decline in total funding for its core 
programs, which has made it even more difficult to live with the inherent weaknesses of its pattern of 
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funding: 
Much of it, and virtually all of the most valuable unrestricted part, is provided on a year- 
by-year basis, with decisions made very close *Q and even afIer the actual use of funds, 
cre!ating great vulnerability to last minute reductions; 
Practices and constraints vary widely among donors, creating management complexities 
which are compounded by changes in these practices by individual donors with little 
notice; 
Late disbursement creates cash-flow problems; and, 
Increased funding restricted to specific projects/programs, combined in some cases with 
reluctance to include reasonable overhead in project costs, distorts programs away from 
approved priorities. 
There has been considerable damage to center programs and center capacity resulting both from 
the decline in fundiig and the manner in which it occurred. At this point, however, there is no cash or 
other looming financial crisis in the CGIAR as a whole. The generous, extraordinary contributions 
received and expected from the World Bank and other donors, combined with careful management by 
centers, will prevent such a crisis occurring in 1994 and 1995. TZle Panel’s task is to address the 
situation from 1996 onwards. 
The Panel has examined a number of options, including those offered by other CGIAR bodies, 
notably the Public Awareness and Resources Committee (PARC) of the CDC and the CGIAR Finance 
Committee, but has not been able to identify simple and straightforward solutions to the financial 
problems. There are, however, a set of interconnected measures drawn in part from the same sources, 
which together offer some hope of putting CGIAR finances on a more stable footing. These measures 
flow from the initial assumption of the Panel that the principal source of funding for the CGIAR system 
will be ODA for the immediate future. They include an additional assumption, which is both practical 
and realistic, of continued donor autonomy with no $Tort to create treaty obligations that might produce 
collective multi-year or pooled funding. 
The essential elements of this approach are: 
0 enhanced efforts at public awareness and fundraising, 
0 the defmition, presentation and approval of the CGIAR research agenda in the matrix 
formulation, 
0 a concerted process of negotiating funding commitments from donors to the CGIAR 
system in the context of the agreed matrix, and 
0 the pursuit of non-conventional funding sources. 
23 
Awareness Creation and Fund Raising 
Increasing the public’s awareness of the importance of international agricultural research and 
intensifying efforts to raise funds are key to the improvement of the financial health of the CGIAR. The 
ongoing work aimed at awareness has the purpose, among others, of laying the basis for a renewed 
wmmitment by donors to the CGIAR, based on the System’s accomplishments and potential. This should 
provide privileged access to development assistance resources through the present difficult period and 
beyond. The Panel encourages major and sustained efforts in this area. 
Intensification of fund raising activities is showing some success, notably the appeals of the 
Chairman of the CGIAR and the co-sponsors to the management levels of aid agencies in the spring of 
1994, which is to be followed up at the high level meeting in February 1995. These moves must be 
acwmpanied by the continued efforts of all stakeholders of the CGIAR, and in particular PARC, to draw 
attention of the management level in donor agencies to the significance of the CG system. 
Presenting the Funding Requirements of the CGIAR Research Agenda 
The Panel is enthusiastic about the matrix planning, budgeting and financing framework proposed 
by the CGIAR Chahman and approved at MTM94 and further refined in the intervening months. The 
transparency and clarity of financing arrangements that the matrix scheme engenders is an essential 
ingredient of the proposed new tinancing arrangements. 
Under this scheme, the research agenda selected for CGIAR support would be presented in the 
matrix form with centers (and other performers such as operating programs) on one axis, and program 
areas on the other. The third dimension of the matrix would be time, starting with the current year and 
progressing by years into the future as far as rational planning of program areas would permit. Separate 
sets of matrices could be prepared for each donor. 
This format would present a clear statement of need in relation to goals. As presented to the 
donors, it would embody the inputs of centers, the recommendations of TAC and the Finance Committee, 
the commenta of the Global Forum (ii that proposal is adopted) and the endorsement of the CGIAR itself. 
Donors would be invited to choose within the matrix how their funds would flow: 
Some might choose to join the World Bank in providing funds to be attributed to those 
areas of the matrix not otherwise funded. 
Donors could continue to provide unrestricted funding to one or more centers. A 
substantial amount of such funding is essential so long as the centers continue to be a 
major instrument of CGIAR action. 
Some donors would be attracted by a program area, and provide funding either for the 
entire wlumn with that heading, or for one or more specific centers or operating 
programs within the program area. Thii opportunity is expected to open possibilities for 
funding from new donors and new sources within existing donors, and may provide an 
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alternative for donors unable to keep up past levels of unrestricted support because of 
changes in policy. 
Donors might in addition, commit funds restricted to projects falling in one or more 
cells, which would thus be considered part of the research agenda. In this way, the 
CGIAR could tap funding sources not available for the broader purposes listed above. 
Project donors would be expected to provide for the appropriate level of overhead within 
project budgets to avoid a situation in which funds from one donor subsidize the project 
supported by another. They would not, however, be expected necessarily to contribute 
unratricted center or program area funding. Centers would be expected not to accept 
funds that may be offered for activities falling outside of the CGIAR research agenda. 
To serve its fundraising purpose, and to attract multi-year commitments, the matrix will need to 
cover several calendar years. Even for effective annual commitments a span of several years is needed 
to give donors time to make the decisions required and provide funds in timely fashion. At the same 
time, the matrix needs to be adjustable as the research agenda changes. The requirements of beii 
reliable over time yet being flexible are not easy to combine, and will challenge in particular the centers 
and TAC. 
‘Ile matrix would need to be spelled out very soon in order to fit into the timetable set for the 
end of the transition period, and implementation of new structures and processes on January 1, 1996. 
An initial version of the matrix with some detail will be needed early in 1995 for initial negotiations with 
donors. Managing the matrix approach over time should be discussed by the Group at MTM95. Centers 
will need early guidance in order to make an adequate presentation to TAC of their 1996 funding needs 
in the new framework in time for TAC to provide its recommendations at ICW95. 
The Panel cautions that too rapid a shift to programs and program fundiig could jeopardize the 
operations of the centers, particularly if such shifts threaten the core skills and capacity a center would 
need to carry out high quality, long-term research. 
Negotiating Funding Commitments 
One premise underpinning the Panel’s proposals is that securing multi-year funding for the system 
is a viable goal. However, not all donors are in a position to provide multi-year funding in the short run 
because of internal f?nancial regulations or policies; others may do so at different times and for different 
periods. Hence, the new ficlng arrangements should encourage multi-year commitments from 
al1 donors, but tolerate annual linaneing procedures and varying forms and durations of 
commitmmts. 
The Panel believes that leadership in negotiating funding commitments should come from the 
CGIAR Chair and the Finance Committee, with support from the CGIAR Secretariat and PARC. 
The goals of the negotiation process would be: 
To secure a commitment in principle-actually in most cases a renewed commitment- 
from as many donors as possible to long-term support of the CGIAR. In making such 
a commitment, donors would agree to participate from time to time in collective 
negotiations on how to meet the funding requirements of the agreed CGIAR research 
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agenda. (Ihis commitment should be obtained from as many donors as possible at the 
high level meeting in February 1995.) 
To secure a multi-year commitment to provide funds to programs and centers under the 
matrix approach. 
Where a multi-year commitment is not immediately possible, or might result in a 
reduction in the level of support, to secure the greatest degree possible of commitment 
to repeated annual contributions made in consideration of the requirements of the CGIAR 
research agenda. 
Where a donor has timds that are not available for general CGIAR purposes, but could 
be used under the applicable donor criteria for part of the CGIAR research agenda, a 
commitment to facilitate the granting of such funds on a restricted or project basis. This 
approach refle& the actual practice of several donors, and corresponds to some forms 
of “co-fmancing” used in World Bank-led collaborative undertakiqs (where the project 
meets common goals, but is managed under its own procedures by the donor). Actual 
negotiation of individual restricted grants is undertaken by the center or operating 
program involved. 
Additional goals would be early decisions, timely disbursement, acceptance of overhead within restricted 
funding, and removal of onerous reporting requirements. 
The Panel recognizes that to achieve these goals with a large number of donors may require an 
iterative process possibly lasting a year or more, and then repeated to keep commitments strong or as 
requirements change. While the specific steps and the order of carrying them out should be determined 
by the Finance Committee, the process might include: 
Careful study of the objectives and procedures of each major donor so that proposals can 
be tailored accordingly. 
Meetings of all uxumitted donors, so that they can encourage each other. 
Discussions with like-minded donors in smaller groups, i.e. Scandinavian or European 
donors, multilateral development bar& foundations, or donors with special interest in 
a specific issue such as the environment, germplasm or public policy. 
Periodic involvement of agency top managers in the decision process. 
At each stage in the negotiation process, the matrix and information about the degree to which 
the research agenda is already funded will be key elements. 
Exactly what is proposed may be easier to grasp by reference to the attached chart (Figure 1) 
showing the process through its various stages, as now envisaged, with the caveat that many details 
remain to be de&mined in consultation with all of the actors involved. In the chart the matrix for the 
year 1997 has been chosen arbitrarily to illustrate the principles. 
The process would start at Centers Week in the year 1995 with a preliminary discussion 
in the presence of all of the centers of the guidelines for the research agenda for 1997, 
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i.e. the year after the coming one. (Note that each matrix would be multiyear in its 
coverage, although the future years might be less compiesely covered than the first one.) 
Although not shown on Figure 1, the Global Forum would consider the CGIAR research 
agenda expressed in the matrix at each of its biennial meetings. At the same time, the 
discussion of Centers Week would be informed by the findings of the Global Forum. 
In the early part of 1996, guided by the outcome of the Centers Week discussion, the 
centers, and the managers of inter-center programs would prepare funding requests for 
1997. Soon thereafter, TAC would consider these requests and propose a matrix for 
1997 accompanied by funding requirements. 
At MI%4 1996, TAC’s draft of the research age&a and its requirements would be 
considered by the Finance Committee. ‘Ihe MTM itself would then review and approve 
TAC’s recommendations and the tentative financing plan proposed by the Committee. 
In the following months, negotiations would be held with donors on funding the agenda 
so that it could be submitted to the Group for final approval at ICW 1996 with funding 
commitments well defined. 
Having approved a funded agenda for the coming year, the Group still at ICW 1996, 
would proceed to the preliminary discussion of the next iteration of the research agenda, 
starting the first stage of the cycle for the year 1998. 
ThePanelrecommenQQreJinecnen t and adoption of a planning and funding cycle along the 
above lines under the leadership of the CGIAR Steering Committee. If the content of the research 
agenda is worthy, which the Panel is confident will be the case, this approach should offer a path toward 
more stable and predictable funding of a research agenda which is technically sound and responsive to 
donor priorities. 
Other Funding Sources 
We understand that the study conducted by the Dowries-Ryan Group for PARC and the Fiice 
Committee co&rms that major replacement of ODA with other fun&g sources in the short run does not 
appear to be feasible. The Panel believes, however, that it is nevertheless worthwhile pursuing non- 
conventional sources of funding, both to secure additional resources and to widen general knowledge of 
and support for the CGIAR System. As possible mechanisms to be considered along with others, the 
Panel would like to suggest: 
admitting to membership countries that can only pay a small member fee, but would be 
willing to pool their contributions to meet minimum CGIAR membership fee (as noted 
in chapter 3), and 
the establishment of a foundation to receive non-conventional contributions (e.g., from 
private firms) and which could be a regular member of the CGIAR. 
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SOME ISSUES INVOLVED IN ESTABLISHING 
THE CGIAR AS AN INTEXNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
A Background Note Prepared for 
the CGIAR Study Panel on Governance and Finance 
by Louis Forget 
Legal Adviser, Policy arxl General Affairs 
The World Bank 
Introduction 
. ‘Ihe view has been expressed from time to time that the CGIAR should gradually change itself 
into an international organization. As the CGIAR is an informal group which functions in a collegial 
manner, formalizing its status would constitute a major change in the nature of the system and the 
manner in which it operates, and would rise a number of issues which would need to be carefully 
considered. This note briefly discusses some of the main issues involved. Should the group decide to 
move in this direction, &rther work would need to be done before the draft charter of an international 
organixation could be presented to the Group for consideration. 
The note deals successively with the purposes of establishing an international organization, the 
scope of its mandate, issues relating to its membership, and its governing organs and decision-making 
processes. 
The first issue to consider would be the purposes of the new entity, i.e. what function it would 
serve. Among the reasons to establish an international organization, and the functions it could be 
entrusted with, the following have been mentioned: 
1. To provide a mechanism under which the decisions of the CGIAR may be implemented. 
Comment: It has been stated that the CGIAR lacks a mechanism to implement its own decisions, 
and that it has to rely on other entities to implement them. The Secretariat is responsible for the 
implementation of the decisions of the CGIAR. In most cases, it discharges this function directly. In 
the case of certain types of decisions, the CGIAR appoints another organization to implement a 
particular decision. For example, it has relied on various members to act as “executing agency” to 
implement its decisions to establish new research centers. The fact that the Secretariat does not enjoy 
legal personality has led it to rely on the World Bank for support. This may at times be a source of 
confusion or inefficiency. Nevertheless, it does not seem to have prevented the CGIAR from having 
its decisions implemented. 
2. To provide an independent entity to allow the functions now carried out by the Executive 
Secretary and his staff to be discharged independentiy of the World Bank or any other international 
organization. 
Al 
Comment: The World Bank provides many services to the Executive Secretary and his staff in 
addition to funding the operations of the Secretariat. For example it provides the legal basis for the 
hiriig of the Secretariat staff, and provides the staff with pension and other benefits. The Bank also 
acts as trustee for a munber of trust funds used by the donors to channel their contributions to the 
CGIAR. Should the Secretariat be separated from the World Bank, there would be need to provide 
the Secretariat with a legal basis for its operations. This could oe another existing international 
organization, or the legal basis could be provided by establishing a new organization. However, since 
there is no plan to change the present arrangements regarding the CGIAR Secretariat, there is no need 
to consider establishing a new imemational organization for this purpose. 
3. To be the one voice through which the CGIAR speaks on international agricultural research 
issues. 
Comment: As the issues related to international agricultural research have become more and 
more complex, and as the CGIAR has become one of the most important components of world 
agricultural research, it has been stated that the CGIAR should speak with one unified aud 
authoritative voice on the international scene, and that thii process would be facilitated by the 
establishment of the CGIAR as an intemational organization. Although the CGIAR is an informal 
group, the Chairman has found it possible to use hi position to state the views of the CGIAR 
intemationally. A recent example is the Chairman’s statement on plant genetic resources issued at the 
meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee on the Convention on Biological Diversity in Nairobi in 
June 1994. It is not clear what would be gained in this respect if, instead of beii the Chairman of 
an informal group, the Chairman was the chief executive of an international organization. The 
Chairman’s authority to speak on behalf of the Group is a function of the consultation and consensus 
building mechanisms that are used to define the CGIAR’s position on the major issues of international 
agricultural research, and does not depend on the existence of the CGIAR as an international 
organixation. 
4. To allow the CGIAR to enter into agreements with other international bodies. 
Comment: This function has received considerable attention recently, as work progressed on the 
agreement with FAO placing the germplasm collections held by the centers under the auspices of 
FAO’s Commission on Plant Genetic Resources. ‘Ihe draft was negotiated on the basis of each center 
signing a separate but identical agreement. Attempts to modify the agreement so that it could be 
signed as one instrument by all centers were not successful. This was mostly due to the late nature of 
the requested change, after the Commission on Plant Genetic Resources and the FAO Governing 
Council has already approved the original draft. It was not because it was inherently impossible to 
devise such an agreement. Wii respect to future agreements of the same type, if it is desired that 
only one instrument be signed by all the centers, this feature could be incorporated in the first draft. 
In any event, the chief executive of an international organixation can only act on behalf of his 
own organixation. If, for example, the new international organixation did not incorporate the research 
centers, the chief executive of the new organ&ion could not act on behalf of the centers except to 
the extent he was authorized to do so by the centers, a situation which is not substantially different 
from the present one. 
It should also be mentioned that as long as the principles of donor independence and center 
autonomy are maintained, there are certain functions that the CGIAR would not be in a position to 
undertake, even if established as an international organization. One would be to obligate the donors 
to provide more funds that they are willing to commit voluntarily; another would be to govern the 
centers. 
A2 
Scope of the Oqanimtion 
As was implied in the foregoing discussion, there would be a range of options as to the scope of 
the mandate to be ednuted to the organixation. 
At one extreme, one could consider an organixation whose purpose would be to take over all the 
tasks now performed by the various entities which make up the CGIAR, including TAC and the 
research centers. Such an organization would obtain the funds necessary to carry out an agreed 
research program, and would carry it out. Under this option, the research centers would be absorbed 
into the new organization and would lose their independent legal status. TAC would become an 
advisory body to the governing organs of the new organization. It would be open to discussion what 
role, if any, would be played by the co-sponsors in such an organ&ion. 
A less extreme option would be to give to the new entity all the functions now exercised in the 
CGIAR except that of carrying out actual research, which would continue to be done by legally 
separate research centers. The new organization would decide on a work program, secure funding for 
it, and ensure that the centers carry out the work programs. In this case, the relations between the 
new organixations and the centers would need to be defined. Various possibilities could be examined, 
from one in which the new organixation directs the centers to carry out their respective part of the 
agreed work program, to a more consensual approach, under which the new organization would enter 
into contracts with each center. 
The informal nature of the CGIAR has helped it integrate non-States, such as philanthropic 
foundations and national research institutions into its membership. Formalization of the CGIAR 
structure would highlight the different nature of some of its members. International organixations are 
normally composed of States. Integrating internationalorganixations into the membership would not 
present difficult problems, as there are examples of in&rnational organizations which have States and 
international organizations as members. Integrating private foundations would be more difficult. 
It should be noted that the model offered by the research centers, which are not “membership 
organixations” is likely not to be suitable for the CGIAR itself, as many countries involved would 
probably prefer that, if the CGIAR is established as an international organixation, the model used is 
the traditional one of a “membership” organization, in which countries become members of the 
organixations and govern its affairs. 
One question that would need to be addressed is whether the organixation would be “universal,” 
i.e., for example, open to all UN, Bank and FAO member countries, or whether membership would 
be limited to donors. If membership were to be limited to donor countries, the threshold contribution 
would need to be defined, as well as a mechanism to eliminate donors whose contributions fall below 
a certain level. If membership was not universal, the question of the representation of developing 
countries would arise. The current system of selection of representatives from developing countries, 
which is already raising concerns on other grounds, may not be acceptable to the developing countries 
in a formally established organization. 
A3 
Organs and De&ion-Making 
Most internationaI organixations have three organs: a plenary universaI body in which all 
members are directly represented, a r&&ted body and a chief executive (in this respect as well, the 
research centers, most of which are governed by board of trustees, are unusual). It would be 
expected that, given the mandate of the new organi&on, the States involved in its establishment 
would want it to have a plenary body in which all member States are represented. It should be noted, 
however, that it is not necessary to establish an international organixation to increase the voice of the 
developing countries in the CGIAR. This can be accomplished within the present informal structure. 
Conversely, establishing an international organixation would not by itself increase the voice of the 
developing countries. 
Whether membership is universal or limited to donors, difficult questions would arise in the 
definition of the rules for decision-making in the new organization. While many recent in&national 
instruments, such as the restructured GEF, emphasize the desire for decisions to be taken by 
consensus whenever possible, there is a need to provide formal rules for decision-making which come 
into play when the organ fails to reach consensus. These rules deal with the voting power of 
members and the majority of votes required for proposals to be approved. 
Conclusion 
Establishing the CGIAR as an international organization would have profound impact on the 
nature of the CGIAR and the manner in which it operates. In particular, it would undermine the 
informality and collegiality which have characterixed the system so far, and whose importance has 
been recently reafikmed. Whether the advantages that would result would be greater than the 
disadvantages would be for the members of the CGIAR to determine. ‘Ihe forgoing discussion would 
seem to indicate that this would not be the case. 
It may be also noted that the participation of a country in the establishment of an international 
organixation such as the CGIAR is an act that would involve many parties in addition to the ministry 
or agency responsible for CGIAR affairs, such as the ministry of foreign affairs, the office of the 
head of State or of government, and possibly the legislature. These other parties would be expected 
to ensure that the proposed establishment is consistent with the country’s overall policies regarding 
intemational organixations, in terms of strucmre, voting power, governing organs, etc. In this 
context, it may be noted that over the last few years, many countries have expressed the view that the 
trend towards an even greater number of international organizations should be curtailed and have 
raised objections to the establishment of new one-s submitted to them for their consideration. While it 
would be expected that decisions to establish the CGIAR as an international organization would only 
be taken after due consideration, the reluctance of many wuntries to engage in such a process would 
lead to the conclusion that it should be undertaken only if it is clearly demonstrated that no alternative 
exists to achieve the objectives set for the CGIAR. 
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